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The Struggle for Gender Equality in
the Northern District of Ohio
Tracy A. Thomas

T

he U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, like many of
its sister courts, was reluctantly drawn into the national debate over sex
equality 1970s. The court’s response mirrored the greater social response, initially showing a hostility to claims of gender discrimination that was slowly displaced by recognition and endorsement of sex equality rights. Three of the
district’s cases on women’s rights that went to the U.S. Supreme Court, discussed in this chapter, helped navigate this shift toward gender equality.
The Northern District was goaded into action by the newly formed Women’s Law Fund (WLF), one of the ﬁrst nonproﬁt litigation organizations in the
nation to bring sex discrimination claims. The WLF was led by Jane Picker, one
of the ﬁrst female law professors at Cleveland State University, and counseled
by board member Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then head of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Women’s Rights Project and later a U.S. Supreme Court
justice. These leaders instigated the reforms needed through the judicial process, believing, like many social justice groups, that the courts were the best
vehicles to bring about change. In 1971, the Fund’s ﬁrst case, LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, challenged mandatory maternity leaves for pregnant
teachers.1 As this chapter will show, the lawyers encountered an incredulous
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court and resistance from the community as they took on deeply embedded
notions of the proper role of women in the workplace and family.
The community backlash continued as advocates sought to protect a woman’s right to bodily autonomy and abortion. In 1973, the Supreme Court legalized abortion in Roe v. Wade.2 The Roe Court recognized a fundamental privacy
right to choose abortion, free from governmental interference in the ﬁrst trimester, but new regulations continued to circumscribe abortion. Two major
abortion regulation cases came before the Northern District on their way to the
Supreme Court: Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron and
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen.3 The Northern District wrestled
with the legality of highly detailed regulations designed to discourage abortion,
ﬁrst upholding them in part but later invalidating the laws. The Supreme Court
overruled the lower courts in both cases. Although the district courts had carefully tried to ﬁt the cases within constitutional parameters, they had not predicted the Supreme Court’s changing standards.
These three cases from Ohio together offer a snapshot of the larger societal change for women’s rights. The nascent women’s movement in the courts
proceeded initially along dual fronts of employment and abortion. The Northern District cases show the tensions and commonalities between these approaches and exemplify the development of broad-scale gender litigation across
the nation.

A Reluctant Agent of Change
In April 1971, the Northern District of Ohio was confronted with one of its earliest
cases of sex discrimination. In LaFleur v. Cleveland Board of Education, Jo Carol
LaFleur, a junior high teacher at an all-black inner-city school in Cleveland,
challenged the board’s policy of requiring unpaid maternity leave for all married female teachers who were more than four months pregnant. The rule also
prohibited a teacher from returning to her job prior to the ﬁrst school term after
her child was three months old, and it did not guarantee her a position, but only
a priority for any vacancy. These maternity policies were part of the long history
of discrimination by schools against women, which forced married and then
pregnant women to resign their jobs.4
The Cleveland maternity leave policy enacted in 1952 was passed because
male administrators thought that it was inappropriate for schoolchildren to see
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a pregnant woman and confront the obvious implications of sexuality. As testimony would show, the policy was motivated by school ofﬁcials’ desire to save a
noticeably pregnant woman from embarrassment in the form of giggling schoolchildren and their comments such as “my teacher swallowed a watermelon,”
and to protect students from the sight of a conspicuously pregnant woman.5 But
the board rationalized its policy during the LaFleur litigation as being important to protecting the health of the woman and baby and to providing continuity
of instruction for the children. The school superintendent who drafted the original regulation believed that women should stay home with their children after
giving birth: “I am a strong believer that young children ought to have the mother
there to take tender care of the babies.” Many of America’s problems, he suggested, stemmed from working mothers who neglected their infants.6
LaFleur thought the policy was “archaic and silly” and refused to quit her
job. She believed that since her baby was due in July, leaving at the end of the
semester better served continuity of instruction rather than leaving abruptly in
mid-March as the principal insisted. (LaFleur had refused to tell the principal
her due date, so he was guessing as to the four-month point.) Furthermore, students who were pregnant were allowed to attend school throughout their pregnancies, and LaFleur taught some of these pregnant students in a transition
class for girls who were at risk for dropping out of school. The idealistic LaFleur
had wanted to teach these students out of her emerging sense of social justice,
utilizing the specialized training she received in “ghetto teaching” in a master
of teaching program she completed at John Carroll University. She thought that
she could serve as a good role model for her students, being a married woman
who was taking care of herself and her baby during pregnancy. The principal
disagreed, and tempers ﬂared as he forced LaFleur out by completing the leave
forms for her.7
If was difﬁcult for LaFleur to ﬁnd a lawyer to take her case. She ﬁled a grievance with the teacher’s union, but the union representative told her to “just go
home and have your baby.” She tried the Cleveland branch of the ACLU, but
it turned down her case, saying it was “a loser.” The organization was instead
focusing its litigation efforts on cases for male students challenging school bans
on beards as a denial of fundamental rights.8 Desperate, LaFleur called the library at the Cleveland Plain Dealer looking for the name of a “women’s lib”
group. The newspaper librarian gave her several numbers, including that for
the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL), through which she reached volunteer attorney Jane Picker.9
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WEAL was founded in Cleveland in 1968 and later headquartered in Washington, D.C., until it disbanded in 1989. It was formed as a small spin-off from
the National Organization of Women (NOW) by more conservative feminists
wishing to avoid issues of abortion and sexuality. Its founder, Dr. Elizabeth Boyer,
explained: “There’s a great difference between the women’s liberation movement
and the women’s rights movement which WEAL represents.”10 WEAL believed
that the abortion issue would discredit the emerging feminist movement and
“feminist respectability.” Instead, the group focused its agenda on the advancement of opportunities for women in education and employment, including monitoring implementation and enforcement of Title IX of the 1972 Education Act
Amendments regarding equal opportunity for women in education and sports.11
Picker became a WEAL volunteer attorney when she moved to Cleveland
in the fall of 1970. A Yale Law School graduate, she relocated to Cleveland
when her husband, Sidney, was hired as a visiting professor at Case Western
Reserve School of Law. When Sidney was offered a permanent position in December 1970, Picker began to look for a job but found it extraordinarily difﬁcult
to ﬁnd a ﬁrm willing to hire a woman. Such resistance led her to conclude that
Cleveland was “the most conservative city” she had ever seen. She had been
raised in the East, lived abroad in Bangkok and Australia, and worked in Washington, D.C., and never before had she been aware of being discriminated
against as a woman as she was in Cleveland. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey eventually hired her as the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst female lawyer to work as an attorney. (Two
other female lawyers worked at the ﬁrm, one as a law librarian and one as a
secretary.) However, the ﬁrm denied her the opportunity to litigate cases as she
desired and instead relegated her to “public law” and backroom research. When
the call came from LaFleur in early 1971, Picker was conﬂicted out of the case
because the ﬁrm and her partner Charles Clarke represented the defendant,
the Cleveland School Board.
Another WEAL volunteer, Carol Agin, tried the case. But Picker handled
all of the research and wrote the briefs. It was her idea to plead the case under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a federal claim for constitutional violations of civil rights.
Picker had been sent to the Cleveland law library on an assignment from the
ﬁrm. While there, she began ﬂipping through the federal employment reporters and read the many cases of successful race discrimination litigation under
section 1983. She thought that the same approach should work for sex, and she
used the general contours of the Fourteenth Amendment to frame the legal issues in LaFleur.12
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The case was assigned to Judge James Connell, a crusty and conservative
seventy-three-year-old former prosecutor who “was very unfriendly to the case.”
He was “very old school” and “believed a woman’s place was in the home, and
therefore, certainly, a pregnant woman’s place was in the home.” Judge Connell
called a pretrial hearing immediately after the papers in the case were ﬁled, just
weeks after LaFleur was forced out of her job. He greeted the counsel for the
school board, Charles Clarke, in a welcoming and gentlemanly manner. He
then turned to Carol Agin and said, “Young woman, why do you waste the federal court’s time with such frivolous matters?” Concerned that the court’s apparent bias would prejudice the plaintiff, Picker asked her neighbor, Case Western
law professor Lewis Katz, to serve as co-counsel in the case. As Katz explained,
“You have to understand. Women were treated very shabbily in and by the profession at that time, and for some years after.”13 Indeed, it would be twenty years
before judicial task forces on gender fairness would denounce this type of gender bias in the courts.14
The two-day hearing in the LaFleur case was, according to Katz, “extremely
unpleasant.” Judge Connell clearly thought this case was ridiculous, and he directed his wrath toward the plaintiffs, sustaining objections that had not been
made and rephrasing many of attorney Agin’s questions. Meanwhile, a second
plaintiff had joined the case—Ann Nelson, the wife of one of Katz’s law students.
The student had come to Katz at midsemester in need of a scholarship when his
pregnant wife lost her job as a Cleveland junior high school teacher. Teachers
in their ﬁrst year of teaching, as Ann Nelson was, were terminated if they became pregnant, rather than given leave and the opportunity to return.
Plaintiffs’ counsel worked to debunk the proffered medical evidence that
there was a risk to the woman and baby if the mother worked during pregnancy.
Their own medical expert, Sarah Marcus, was a feisty, eighty-year-old obstetrician who mocked the school district’s assumptions about women’s frailty. She
noted that most women engaged in strenuous work at home: “There is nothing
that the teacher does as a teacher that is any more strenuous than what a pregnant mother does with housework; and her attentions to the other children, if
she has any, are also strenuous.”15 Katz tried to cross-examine the defense’s medical expert despite the judge’s interruptions—Judge Connell believed he had a
good understanding of the medical science, having grown up as the son of an
Akron obstetrician—and Katz did get the defense expert to admit that work did
not negatively impact a woman’s pregnancy, a point that would be central on
appeal. Defense counsel focused on the disabilities of the pregnant woman.
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He asked LaFleur whether this was her ﬁrst baby, to which the seven-monthpregnant woman responded, “Yes.” Later, she realized that she would have
answered differently had he asked her if this was her ﬁrst pregnancy; she had
been pregnant before but miscarried early while she was teaching ﬁrst grade.
That answer might have fueled the misconception that teaching was harmful to
the baby.16
At the end of the trial, plaintiffs asked for an injunction to stay the board’s
decisions. Judge Connell coldly responded, “You’ll get what you deserve and
you don’t deserve an injunction.”17 The court denied their request for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, ﬁnding the school board policy to be
reasonable and constitutionally permissible. Judge Connell determined that
the mandatory maternity regulation was reasonable primarily because it minimized classroom distractions and disruptions when the “teachers suffered many
indignities as a result of pregnancy which consisted of children pointing, giggling, laughing and making snide remarks causing interruption and interference
with the classroom program of study.” He also found that the problem of the
teacher’s health and safety was a valid concern for the school board in that “in
an environment where the possibility of violence and accident exists, pregnancy
greatly magniﬁes the probability of serious injury.”18 The plaintiffs urged the
court to apply a more rigorous level of judicial scrutiny due to the fundamental
nature of the interests involved. The district court, however, relied on the 1908
Supreme Court case of Muller v. Oregon, which upheld a maximum hours law
to protect women. Judge Connell quoted: “The two sexes differ in structure of
body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical
strength, in the capacity for long continued labor, particularly when done standing, the inﬂuence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the
self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence.”19
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed Judge
Connell’s decision, ﬁnding the maternity rule arbitrary and unreasonable in its
overbreadth. In a 2-to-1 decision, the majority found that the school board’s
justiﬁcations were not reasonable and barely credible: “Basic rights such as
those involved in the employment relationship cannot be made to yield to embarrassment.” In rejecting the mandatory leave rule, the Sixth Circuit relied on
Reed v. Reed, decided after the LaFleur trial court decision, in which the Supreme Court held for the ﬁrst time that sex was a classiﬁcation deserving of
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.20
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When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the LaFleur case, Jane Picker
took over as lead counsel. By then she had left her law ﬁrm and was one of three
tenure-track female law professors at Cleveland State University. Picker created
the Women’s Law Fund in 1972 to ﬁnance precedent-setting litigation for women’s rights.21 Like other litigation advocacy groups of the times modeled after
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and its success in the school desegregation cases, the WLF existed to fund rights litigation
and bring about meaningful social change through the courts. Law professor
Ruth Bader Ginsburg served on the board of the WLF, and Picker reciprocated,
serving on Ginsburg’s board at the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, also organized in 1972. Ginsburg had taken pro bono referrals for the New Jersey ACLU
since the late 1960s, cases that were referred to her, she said, because “sex discrimination cases were regarded as a woman’s job.” She accepted the cases because of her impression that the ACLU nationally and locally was not enthusiastic
about taking on women’s rights cases and that women were not adequately represented on the organization’s governing board. The ACLU ﬁrst focused its
efforts on sex discrimination in the fall of 1971 when it declared women’s
rights an issue of great urgency and asked all afﬁliates to give it high priority
in funding and litigation.22 Feminist litigation began to take on a national
agenda as attorneys in the sex discrimination cases shared information and coordinated efforts. As Justice Ginsburg reﬂected, “Progress does not occur automatically, but requires a concerted effort to change habitual modes of thinking
and action.”23 Picker agreed: “It was no simple evolution. We made the change
that happened.”24
The WLF was initially funded by generous grants from the Ford Foundation. Spurred by tenacious female staff members, Ford was the earliest philanthropy to commit to the women’s movement.25 The foundation’s ﬁrst feminist
pilot project was the LaFleur case. Ford began negotiations for a litigation grant
with Jane Picker as a representative of WEAL. When Picker’s WEAL colleagues
objected to litigating a case dealing with pregnancy discrimination, she left the
organization, taking with her Ford’s money for a two-year start-up grant for the
WLF. But in 1984, Ford’s WLF funding ended: in the 1980s, a change in leadership at Ford shifted its emphasis to issues affecting women of color and poor and
working-class women.26 Picker turned elsewhere for ﬁnancial support, moving
her organization to the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, where she established a sex discrimination clinic staffed by students and funded primarily by
attorney fee awards.27
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The LaFleur case was the WLF’s ﬁrst and perhaps biggest case. Picker argued the case before the U.S. Supreme Court in January 1974 in what was her
ﬁrst argument of any kind before a court. Amicus briefs ﬂowed in on both sides.
Delta Air Lines, which ﬁred pregnant stewardesses, supported the school board.
The Nixon administration, in the heat of the Watergate cover-up, sided with
the teachers. Picker’s sense was that the Court was not taking this case seriously.
Just before the argument, she saw the justices passing around a journal article
called “Love’s Labors Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves,” and she
watched them chuckle like schoolboys.28 She began her argument more angry
than nervous. The ﬁrst question from Justice Harry Blackmun asked her whether
she really saw any difference between a man losing his job because he refused
to shave his beard and a woman losing her job because she was pregnant. The
tall and imposing Picker put her hands on her hips and said that such distinctions were “getting into ludicrous questions” and that analogies between the
beard cases and the pregnancy cases were “indeed ludicrous.”29
The Supreme Court ruled for the women but rejected the equality analysis
urged by Picker and the appellate court. Instead, the Court grounded its decision in due process privacy rights, harkening back to Roe v. Wade and the right
to choose an abortion, decided just one year before. “This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause. By acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity
leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of these protected freedoms.” The opinion by Justice Potter Stewart emphasized the procedural aspects of due process in its concern over the school board’s irrebuttable
presumption that pregnant women were unable to continue working later in
their pregnancies, rather than using a more individualized determination. The
Court also rejected the board’s purported reasons of continuity of instruction
and maternal health, noting that the policy was originally inspired by “other,
less weighty considerations” and the “outmoded taboos” of saving pregnant
teachers from the embarrassment of giggling students and insulating children
from the sight of a conspicuously pregnant woman.30
The Court’s decision to abandon the equal protection claim and all of its
promise for women’s rights infuriated Picker.31 Counsel for the school board
had urged this approach, cautioning the Court in his rebuttal that the question
of equal protection was “one of the most evasive issues that this Court has to determine” and that “with all due respect to my sisters at the bar, [it] does go
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somewhat beyond the narrow issue in this case.”32 The case as litigated, however, clearly presented the issue of equal protection, even if the Court was unwilling to go there. Justice Blackmun’s conference papers and memorandum
on LaFleur acknowledged that equal protection would have provided an “easier” and “cleaner” basis for the decision but indicated that none of the justices,
except perhaps Justice Thurgood Marshall, thought pregnancy distinctions constituted discrimination on the basis of sex.33 Conceptualized as due process, the
case held little precedential power for the women’s movement. Picker had hoped
for an equal protection decision early in the women’s rights litigation that would
have accomplished the purposes of the then pending equal rights amendment
(ERA), which Picker believed was redundant with the equality guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.34 The due process decision narrowed the issue to
procedural technicalities of irrebuttable presumptions and was useless in ﬁghting
other sex discrimination battles. As Jo Carol LaFleur later recounted, her case
was a leading opinion in the constitutional law textbooks her class used when
she was a law student in 1975—textbooks that her fellow students asked her to
autograph—but it soon became just a footnote.35
Soon after LaFleur, the Court began to address sex discrimination claims
under equal protection. Congress amended Title VII of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act to apply to public schools, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission adopted a guideline that prohibited special maternity
leave rules as sex discrimination. In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act deﬁning pregnancy discrimination as “sex” discrimination.36
But LaFleur was still a milestone in the legal status of women in the workplace
and had the tangible effect of quickly invalidating the many mandatory maternity leave policies nationwide that had predominated since the 1950s. As LaFleur
later reﬂected, “Sometimes it takes a trial lawyer to vindicate a person’s rights;
and . . . every now and then advocacy for one client ripples throughout the nation and aids thousands of persons, altering the cultural contours and drowning
ugly stereotypes.”37
In the end, LaFleur and Nelson were awarded back pay and attorneys fees.
LaFleur refused the punitive reassignment position she was offered in the most
violent Cleveland school and instead worked as a teacher in suburban Lakewood until she began law school in 1974, ﬁrst at Cleveland State and then in
Utah. She became a public defender, clinical law professor, private attorney,
and mediator. Reﬂecting on the case, LaFleur (now Nessett-Sale) said, “I’m not
quite sure why I started my case. . . . There must have been a lot of other women
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who were affected by this rule. . . . The fundamental unfairness of it seemed
morally wrong, not just stupid but wrong; and that men were making the decisions didn’t help, because they didn’t know what it was to be pregnant. It wasn’t
fair, and it made me angry.”38
She recalled how her young son, Michael, attended the Sixth Circuit argument in LaFleur, at her lawyer’s suggestion. She and Michael rode up the elevator with an elderly man who remarked, “He’s a cute little guy,” and she replied,
“He’s a sweetheart.” When she later saw that man, retired Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, sitting on her panel, she was just glad the toddler had not been
having a tantrum on the way to the courtroom. In a remembrance of the case,
LaFleur poignantly acknowledged her children—her college-age daughter, who
helped edit the article, and her son, “the baby at the center of the lawsuit, who
died in his youth.”39

Abortion as a Woman’s Right
The LaFleur case reached the Supreme Court at the crest of the feminist wave,
in October 1973. Congress adopted the ERA in 1972, and more than half the
state legislatures ratiﬁed the amendment over the next few months. Congress
also passed the Equal Pay Act in 1973. And in January 1973, the Supreme Court
decided Roe v. Wade, recognizing a woman’s right to choose an abortion.
Abortion had become a women’s rights issue beginning in the late 1960s.
The procedure was criminalized in the late nineteenth century, altering the
common-law practice that had permitted abortion up until the time of quickening at four months. Efforts to reform the criminal laws began in the 1950s and
1960s, led by public health ofﬁcials concerned about the injuries and deaths
resulting from illegal abortions. They sought reforms such as those suggested by
an American Law Institute proposal, ﬁrst made in 1957, that gave doctors greater
authority to decide when “therapeutic abortions” were justiﬁable for the physical
or mental health of the mother. Feminists then began to connect their concern
with the ability of women to participate fully in the economy with the ability of
women to remove the burdens of childbearing by controlling their reproductive lives. An inﬂuential speech by Betty Friedan in February 1969 expanded
this feminist argument by declaring that abortion was the right of women to
control their own bodies, their own lives, and their own place in society. Four
states—Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington—legalized abortion in 1970,
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and courts in seven other states declared their criminal abortion statutes unconstitutional. In 1973, Roe then recognized a woman’s fundamental privacy right
to choose an abortion in consultation with her doctor. Immediately after Roe,
legislatures continued to pass abortion restrictions, fueled by the growing right
to life movement that expanded nationally in 1973 beyond its original sponsorship by the Catholic Church. But “the decision in Roe v. Wade neither started
nor ended the debate over abortion.”40
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron involved a challenge
to one of these post-Roe regulations. The case came at the beginning of the
public debate on abortion, an issue that had previously been relegated to private
discussion and underground practice. After the Supreme Court legalized abortion in Roe, the issue became publicly visible in the Akron, Ohio, area when
three abortion clinics began operating. Women traveled to Akron from all parts
of Ohio and neighboring states for legal and affordable abortions. In August
1976, two leaders in the Greater Akron Right to Life organization, Jane Hubbard
and Ann Marie Segedy, proposed that the city regulate abortion. The Akron City
Council did not pass the proposed ordinance on the advice of the city’s legal
department, which concluded the law was unconstitutional, but instead passed
a narrower law requiring only that abortions after the ﬁrst three months of pregnancy had to be performed in hospitals.41
A second and more comprehensive abortion regulation was then proposed
in October 1977, shortly before council elections. The regulation was drafted by
Alan Segedy, a lawyer for the right to life group, in consultation with two law
professors at the University of Notre Dame and the University of Texas.42 The
regulation was designed to be a model for national restrictions on abortion, and
it was quickly adopted by twenty states. Similar municipal regulations had been
passed (and declared unconstitutional) in Chicago and St. Louis.43 The Akron
regulation had seventeen provisions requiring, among other things: (1) the performance of second-trimester abortions in hospitals; (2) parental consent for
minors under ﬁfteen; (3) parental notiﬁcation for minors between ﬁfteen and
eighteen; (4) informed consent for all women, pursuant to highly detailed disclosures by the physician on the risks and procedures of abortion, the possible
dire physical and emotional consequences of abortion, and the fact that “the
unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception”; (5) a twentyfour-hour waiting period following this counseling; and (6) the “humane disposal of the fetus.”44 Akron’s chief trial attorney, Willard F. Spicer, advised the
council that the law was unconstitutional, saying, “There’s no question in my
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mind if the ordinance was passed it would be knocked out very quickly.” He also
detailed in a memo the city’s exposure to signiﬁcant attorneys fees and damages
if it lost the case.45 Just a year earlier, a three-judge panel on the Northern District had struck down a similar Ohio statute requiring parental consent.46
The proposed Akron ordinance triggered a series of heated public meetings
before the City Council Health and Social Services Committee during the
snowy winter of 1978, when Akron was hit by a blizzard dubbed the “storm of
the century.”47 Each hearing was packed with 200 to 300 people. NOW led the
organized opposition to the ordinance. The supporters were led by a national
right to life leader from Cincinnati, Dr. J. C. Willke. With his wife, Willke had
self-published a book in 1971 called the Handbook of Abortion, which soon
became a bible for the right to life movement.48 The county health director,
Dr. William Keck, testiﬁed against the bill, arguing that professional ethics and
existing regulations were sufﬁcient assurances of quality health care.49 Religious
leaders came out strongly for the ordinance: the Catholic bishop lobbied parishes; a Catholic nun and principal contacted parents from her school; and an
Orthodox Jew, Marvin Weinberger, was the driving force of the local movement.
Both the national Catholic Church and the Orthodox Jewish leadership had
spoken out against abortion and called for active repeal of state laws that liberalized grounds for the procedure. Weinberger, a law student who was described
as “overzealous,” talked about “little stunts” he used to manipulate the media
and attract publicity. These included an all-night prayer vigil in frigid weather
on the eve of the council vote, which was attended by 600 antiabortion protestors and was held at the Lutheran church across the street from council chambers. The vigil made the national nightly news on all three existing television
channels. On the day of the vote, 150 people overﬂowed council chambers and
the hallway to hear the ﬁnal forty-ﬁve-minute debate. Thirty protestors paraded
outside of chambers, wrapped in blankets against the cold.50 In hindsight, it
seems the feminist movement was surprised by and unprepared for the determination of the abortion opposition, perhaps naively assuming that Roe had settled the question of the availability of abortion.
The Akron abortion resolution passed by a vote of 7 to 6. The lone Republican on the council of thirteen, John Frank, voted against the regulation. Frank
later said his own personal experience involving an unplanned pregnancy of his
former girlfriend persuaded him that abortion was none of the council’s business.
He declared, “It’s a woman decision whether or not to have a baby. Period.”51 The
two women on the council split their vote. Kathleen Greissing, a nurse, voted for
176

The Struggle for Gender Equality

it as an assurance of “good quality healthcare for women.” Elsie Reaven, who
was ousted as chair of the Health and Social Services Committee in a move to
shepherd the ordinance through, was outraged that the “dominant male faction
in council had the arrogance to persist against all reason in burdening and possibly encumbering women.” The ordinance became law when the mayor neither signed nor vetoed the bill.52
The ACLU brought suit on behalf of three abortion clinics and one doctor.
No pregnant woman would agree to be a plaintiff because the trial judge, Leroy
Contie, refused to allow the women (or the doctors) to proceed anonymously
under pseudonyms, as was commonly done in abortion cases.53 A putative plaintiff detailed her fear regarding the publicity entailed in participating in the case
and the potential embarrassment, harassment, and personal attacks. The brief
in support of the motion explained that “many citizens of Akron, Ohio, have
had strong emotional reaction to the debate over the propriety of abortion,” and
it detailed the “manifestations of social strife” that had occurred including regular public demonstrations, threatening and harassing telephone calls and letters,
and one act of arson. Even plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Stephan Landsman, a professor at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, initially turned down the case because
he did not want abortion demonstrations in front of his house. His wife’s incredulous reaction to his fears—“Are you kidding me?”—convinced him to
take the case.
The case proceeded as a question of women’s health. At trial, plaintiffs argued that the Akron abortion ordinance was a “straightjacket for doctors.” Defendants argued that women’s health concerns necessitated regulation. The case
became a battle of the experts. Plaintiffs presented prestigious medical experts
supported by the national ACLU, including one who had received a Nobel
Prize in the Philosophy of Medicine. The right to life intervenors, who led the
defense’s case, proffered less impressive witnesses who were easily discredited
on cross-examination. This litigation of abortion as a medical issue, however,
rendered the women involved invisible. As Bonnie Bolitho, a witness and counselor at one of the abortion clinics, later said, “It was pretty clear to me that the
vast majority of men involved in this were not interested in the lives of individual women.”54
Justice Blackmun’s medical analysis in Roe, derived from his experience as
an attorney for the Mayo Clinic, seemed to call for this type of health care approach. Roe had framed abortion as an issue of doctors’ paternalistic care and
medical science, even while offering a seemingly objective ground for legalizing
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abortion. The emphasis on the medical nature of abortion affected the strategy
of legislatures and litigants, including the parties in the Akron case. It was only
on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Akron plaintiffs secondarily articulated the issue as the denial of women’s autonomy and a portrayal of women as
irrational and incapable decision makers. But “casting abortion as a medical
decision shifts the focus away from women. . . . Protecting physicians’ rights
provided little or no foundation for according women rights. Indeed, it undermined women and their rights by denying them the respect necessary to support their right of choice.”55
Judge Contie was a conservative, Catholic Italian American who by most
accounts was considered a “great judge,” respected for his hard work and known
as a “pretty tough character.”56 A Nixon appointee, he was the ﬁrst Northern
District judge to sit in Akron (nominated to ﬁll James Connell’s seat just after
the LaFleur case), and he was later appointed by President Ronald Reagan to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Contie had served as law director for the city of Canton and was well known for his aggressive attack on local
Maﬁa crime and police corruption, which led to the bombing of his home.
Judge Contie made a particular effort in the case to distance himself from
the national political controversy over abortion: “Analytically, . . . this case is no
different than the numerous others that come before this Court. It is the duty of
this Court to determine the controversy before it based upon the requirements
of the Constitution as expounded by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In considering the present case, this Court has attempted to do just that, nothing more and nothing less.” He added a footnote,
quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter: “As a member of this Court, I am not justiﬁed
in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how
deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard. . . . It
can never be emphasized too much that one’s own opinion about the wisdom
or evil of a law should be excluded altogether when one is doing one’s duty on
the bench.”57
Judge Contie issued a compromise decision almost one year after the trial,
and both sides claimed they had won. Antiabortion leaders called the ruling
“terriﬁc” and “a major victory for pro-life people,” but the head of the Ohio
ACLU retorted, “Another such victory and they [the right to life leaders] will
be permanently undone.”58 The decision invalidated parental consent, parental
notiﬁcation, detailed informed consent, disposal restrictions, and clinic inspection. It upheld the twenty-four-hour waiting period, the doctor’s explanation of
178

The Struggle for Gender Equality

risks and procedures, and reporting requirements. Contie’s approach was careful and measured but frustrating to the plaintiffs, who wanted him to consider
the underlying issues of council’s improper use of religious motives in legislating abortion. The court seemed to be searching for a practical way to split the
proverbial baby, constrained to follow the commands of Roe yet resistant to embracing the evolving precepts of gender equity reﬂected in the abortion issue.59
The Sixth Circuit, in a 2-to-1 decision, invalidated all of the provisions except for two: parental notiﬁcation and the hospital requirement for second-term
abortions. The appellate court criticized Judge Contie for employing a less demanding judicial review than that required by Roe for ﬁrst-trimester restrictions.
Contie had used a less exacting standard than strict scrutiny by asking whether
the regulation was unduly burdensome and whether the government had a
valid state interest.60
The U.S. Supreme Court forcefully struck down the Akron law, reafﬁrming
its abortion rights jurisprudence ten years after Roe.61 Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority in a 6-to-3 decision, found some of the provisions to be
motivated by impermissible objectives: “It is fair to say that much of the information required is designed not to inform the woman’s consent but rather to
persuade her to withhold it altogether.” The Court applied heightened scrutiny
to invalidate the ﬁve provisions it considered, and it rejected a lower standard of
inquiry that “would uphold virtually any abortion regulation under a rationalbasis test.” The solicitor general for the Reagan administration, Rex Lee, argued
for the abandonment of the Roe strict scrutiny review in favor of the lesser “undue burden” standard. Justice Blackmun, author of Roe, asked him point-blank,
“Mr. Solicitor General, are you asking that Roe v. Wade be overruled?” Lee responded no, saying that he was simply arguing for a standard that accommodated a deference to the legislature.62
Akron’s law director, Robert Pritt, also saw the case as one involving legislative power and the principle of local home rule. He had initially defended the
ordinance on legal, rather than moral, grounds, but he became troubled by abortion by the end of the case. Pritt was concerned about the “tremendous amount
of money” allegedly being made by the clinics, as was Councilman Ray Kapper,
who said, “I talked to a lot of people over those years and a lot of them don’t
know what kind of money those rip-off artists were making off teen-agers.”63
The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Akron was seen as an enormous
symbolic victory for women’s rights, with the practical effect of invalidating the
abortion regulations of more than twenty-one states. Judge David Dowd, Contie’s
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successor on the bench, awarded the plaintiffs attorneys fees of $368,710.64 Councilman John Frank demanded that Willke and the national right to life organization pay the city’s expenses, but they refused, politely thanking the city for its
valiant antiabortion efforts.65 The share of fees paid to Cleveland-Marshall College of Law was used for the Harry Blackmun Scholarship Fund, named for the
author of the Roe decision. Justice Blackmun himself attended the dedication,
lured to Cleveland by the promise of a much-beloved baseball game with Cleveland Hall of Fame pitcher Bob Feller.66
The invalidation of the abortion regulation in City of Akron, however, remained good law for only a short time. Less than a decade later, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court reversed course and upheld provisions
requiring informed consent, twenty-four-hour waiting periods, and parental consent.67 Today, Ohio, like many states, has reenacted the types of abortion restrictions that were previously struck down.68 The decision in City of Akron is now
usually cited, if it is cited at all, for the dissent by the newly appointed Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor, which showed the ﬁrst inkling that the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence was in doubt.

A Shifting Perspective
Just three years after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Akron, the Northern
District once again considered the legality of parental notiﬁcation. In Akron
Reproductive Center v. Rosen, the court considered a 1985 Ohio law that required
a minor under the age of eighteen to notify one parent about a planned abortion.69 Unlike the parent notiﬁcation provision struck down in City of Akron, this
law included a judicial bypass exception.
Judge Ann Aldrich was assigned the case and granted both the preliminary
and the permanent injunctions invalidating the parental notiﬁcation law. Considering the facial validity of the law, Aldrich found numerous constitutional
defects with the bypass provision, including a lack of anonymity, no expedited
process, confusing pleading forms, the clear and convincing standard, and the
physician’s duty to notify. Aldrich found that the law had potential for “violations
of the constitutional rights of mature minors and minors for whom notiﬁcation
would not be in their best interests.”70 The sponsor of the bill, Representative
Jerome Luebbers of Cincinnati, said, “I fully expected that the judge would do
this. She’s predictable.”71
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Judge Aldrich was predictable because she had distinguished herself as one
of the most liberal members of the court, with a strong commitment to social
justice. A framed needlepoint slogan hanging on the wall of her chambers read:
“Women who seek to be equal with men lack ambition.” Standing over six feet
tall, Aldrich was a tough woman who had been on her own from the age of
eight, when her mother died in a Rhode Island hurricane. She rebuilt railroad
lines in Yugoslavia after World War II, raced Siberian huskies, and married a
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent as her ﬁrst husband. She was the only
woman in her class at New York University Law School, and she recounted how
she was hated by most of her classmates, who thought she was taking space from
a worthy veteran and was there just to get a husband. As an attorney and law
professor, she focused her efforts on racial justice. She represented the United
Church of Christ and sued the Federal Communications Commission to make it
easier for minorities to own radio stations in the South. Aldrich arrived in Cleveland in 1968 as the ﬁrst full-time female law professor at Cleveland-Marshall,
where she was later joined by WLF founders Jane Picker and Lizabeth Moody.
Women still constituted less than 1 percent of law professors nationwide at the
time, even though the ﬁrst woman had been appointed to a tenure-track position at Berkeley in 1919.72 Aldrich was instrumental in founding the law school’s
diversity student recruitment program. She drove to Tupelo, Mississippi, seeking to ﬁnd qualiﬁed future law students at the historically all-black teachers’
colleges of the South. The students, among them the future Ohio appellate judge
Patricia Blackmon, often came with nothing, and Professor Aldrich supported
them, even inviting them to live in her home.73
Aldrich was the ﬁrst woman judge in the Northern District, appointed in
1980 by President Jimmy Carter. She followed the legacy of Florence Allen,
the ﬁrst female judge elected to the state court in Ohio in 1921 and appointed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1934. Carter made a determined effort to increase the number of women and black federal judges; he
would appoint forty-one women to the bench during his tenure. Yet like most
federal and state courts, the Northern District would remain less than 20 percent female for the next twenty-ﬁve years.74 When a new judicial position was
created in the Northern District, the women’s rights advocates went into high
gear. Advocates such as Lana Moresky from NOW worked to vet female candidates. Most of those candidates were law professors, including three from
Cleveland State, as there was a lack of senior women in corporations or law
ﬁrms at that time.
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Once appointed to the bench, Judge Aldrich encountered turmoil and collegial difﬁculties on the court when she accused the chief judge of inﬂuence
peddling and when she herself was accused of lying for romantic gain. The
scandal that ensued temporarily diminished the dignity of Cleveland’s federal
bench, leading one judge to say, “I wish this were all a bad dream and we could
wake up and say it’s over.”75
With one woman on the court, the potential existed for litigants in gender
cases to ﬁnd a more receptive judicial audience. As empirical work has shown,
there are signiﬁcant differences in voting patterns among judges in sex discrimination cases, with male judges much less likely to decide in favor of the plaintiff.76 One lawyer representing a defendant in an employment sex discrimination
case before Judge Aldrich seemed concerned about this inclination and asked
the judge to recuse herself. She refused. In Akron II, Aldrich showed an appreciation of the practical difﬁculties facing young women seeking abortions, even
though she did not accept the plaintiffs’ arguments completely. She found that
the evidentiary standard in the bypass procedure created “an unacceptably high
risk of erroneous determinations,” since “the judge’s decision will necessarily
be based largely upon subjective standards without the beneﬁt of any evidence
other than a woman’s testimony.”77 As Aldrich had suspected, many of these
judicial bypass decisions turned out “to be at the whim of the judge.” One judge
denied a judicial exemption to a seventeen-year-old despite evidence of physical
abuse by her father, another judge denied a bypass because a seventeen-yearold girl had not had enough “hard knocks,” and a third judge denied the exception because the teenager refused to ﬁle a paternity suit against her partner.78
The law took effect after the Supreme Court overruled Judge Aldrich’s decision in Ohio v. Akron Reproductive Center (Akron II). Though the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals had afﬁrmed the unconstitutionality of the statute, the Supreme
Court found the judicial bypass procedure valid.79 Justice Blackmun vigorously
dissented, ﬁnding Ohio’s bypass procedure to be a “tortuous maze” that deliberately placed a pattern of obstacles in the path of pregnant minors. He found
the challenged provisions to be merely “poorly disguised elements of discouragement for the abortion decision.”80 Counsel for the plaintiffs, Linda Sogg,
had tried to make these points at oral argument, explaining how the law “stacks
the decks” against the minor. But Sogg was encumbered by a shrill voice and a
lack of appreciation for the tenuousness of the abortion right among the justices. They were more persuaded by the legalistic arguments of Rita Eppler
from the Ohio Attorney General’s Ofﬁce, who argued that the law balanced the
rights of minor women against the rights and interests of their parents.81
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In upholding the parental notiﬁcation law, Justice Anthony Kennedy and
two other justices applied a low level of judicial scrutiny, concluding that the
regulation did not impose an undue burden and that it was a rational way to
further the end of protecting the health of young women. This standard, suggested by Justice O’Connor’s dissent in City of Akron, was subsequently adopted
by the controlling plurality of the Court two years after Akron II in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.82 The Casey decision identiﬁed an important government
interest in protecting a minor’s mental health from the psychological risk that
she might later regret her abortion. This mental health rationale was later extended to all women by the Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, which
upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act banning a rarely used late-term
abortion procedure. The Carhart Court held it was important to protect adult
women from the alleged mental and emotional consequences of the decision to
have an abortion. Scientiﬁc studies conducted after the decision, however, concluded that the evidence did not support the claim that abortion caused mental
health problems in women.83 A scathing dissent by Justice Ginsburg in Carhart
emphasized that the rationale of protecting women “reﬂects ancient notions
about women’s place in the family and under the Constitution—ideas that have
long since been discredited.”84 These abortion decisions reinforced stereotypes
about women’s primary role as mothers and the assumed irrationality of their
decision making—normative concerns of gender that reached beyond the issue
of abortion.85
The Northern District of Ohio was drawn into the national debate over women’s rights through a series of key cases that ultimately were resolved by the U.S.
Supreme Court. These cases served as vehicles for meaningful social change
for women, even while they also served to reinforce conventional gender norms.
The cases were fueled by dedicated women advocates, parties, and judges who
understood the need for social change to promote gender equality. Although
the courts often operated out of a sense of the rule of law, they did address the
claims of sex equality that came before them, ultimately acknowledging women’s rights as they developed.
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